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Abstract—We introduce a model-based reliability estimation
to preserve application availability in CPU-FPGA systems ex-
posed to soft errors under varying environment conditions. The
estimation is used as an in-system method to select a suitable
configuration for changing radiation conditions. This allows
systems to autonomously adapt their configuration in order
to balance between reliability and performance. Such a self-
adaptation goes beyond the state-of-the-art, where adaptation
relies on preplanned reactive mode changes. By autonomously
evaluating new configurations, our self-adaptation process is
capable of increasing the availability by selecting the configu-
ration with the desired application reliabilities for the current
environment conditions.
Index Terms—Autonomous Systems, Reliability, Self-adaption
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Long life times of systems such as space probes often
have the effect that the environmental conditions change, in
which a system operates. Among the more common factors
such as temperature and humidity is also radiation, which can
cause Single Event Effects (SEEs) in electronic circuits and
can ultimately lead to application failure. This is becoming a
major concern with ever shrinking transistor size. To ensure
a suitable reliability, traditional designs pursue an approach,
where designers consider worst-case conditions under which
certain applications of a system are expected to operate with-
out failure, e.g. a solar flare for space applications. However,
this often results in poor resource usage when operating in
average conditions. One alternative is to equip applications
with different modes of operation, to react to different en-
vironment conditions, e.g. to switch between redundant and
non-redundant operation to maintain the availability of an ap-
plication. Yet, such reactive responses to environment change
imply that they are planned in advance, as different modes
require different amounts of resources. Further, predefining
reactions requires knowledge to what extent the environment
is possibly changing, in order to design these modes of
operation. Depending on the range of possible changes, this
already opens up a huge design space. Although, automatic
mechanisms are available to explore such a design space (e.g.
[1]) in order to look for a balanced trade-off between fault-
tolerance measures and performance, they still suffer from
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Fig. 1. Autonomous system setup, consisting of a model domain (blue, left)
responsible for configuration and control, and an execution domain (green,
right) consisting of the actual hardware and software.
expect, are still unknown. This makes it a hard challenge
to design for high availability under varying conditions, as
the reliability of an application cannot suitably adjust to
environment conditions.
Further, both approaches, worst-case design and multiple
operation modes with different fault-tolerance mechanisms,
also suffer from the fact that they have to be repeated by
the designer in the lab, e.g. when an application is added
or removed from the system, or just updated. If the system
hosts an application set with mixed-critical requirements,
i.e. different safety levels, the situation becomes even more
complicated. In mixed-criticality (MC) systems the designers
have to guarantee that not only the applications operate with
a sufficient reliability and performance, but also that appli-
cations of different criticalities are sufficiently independent
of each other [2]. This motivates to automate the process of
augmenting the applications with fault-tolerance mechanisms
and to decide on whether the achieved reliability is sufficient
for defined operation conditions. By outsourcing this process
from the lab-based design phase to the operation phase in a
system’s lifetime, it allows the system to autonomously adapt
to changing conditions.
Consequently, a two-step process follows: First, new config-
urations must be generated, which can be optimized according
to an objective function. In a second step, the new configura-
tion must be checked whether it fulfills all requirements of all
applications in the system.
Figure 1 shows the conceptual setup of such a system.
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A Multi-Change Controller (MCC) hosts the model domain,
consisting of the model itself (red), as well as configuration
generation and verification (blue). Based on a cross-layer
model that captures relevant aspects of the system, new
configurations can be generated and subsequently checked for
requirements satisfaction. If a new configuration satisfies all
requirements and is rated as an improvement to the current
one, it can be deployed into the execution domain. Verifi-
cation is separated due to the fact that not all requirements
can be systematically considered during configuration gen-
eration. E.g. software response times are hard to optimize
if arbitrary activation patterns are assumed. Consequently,
an autonomous configuration and verification goes beyond
a multi-dimensional optimization of requirement satisfaction.
However, here we focus on application reliability, which is
challenged by soft errors in the underlying HW platform.
Contribution: In this paper, we demonstrate a self-adaptive,
model-based reconfiguration control that allows to adapt the
system to varying environment conditions. Through adapting
the configuration of the system to maintain a desired appli-
cation reliability under the changing radiation conditions we
increase application availability.
II. RELATED WORK
The field of increasing application resilience against soft
errors has a long-standing history in integrated circuit (IC)
design. W.r.t. related work we want to focus on three core
aspects of our paper: i) the overhead of protection mechanisms
ii) the adaptivity of the system after deployment, i.e. after a
lab-based design and integration phase, and iii) the system’s
self-awareness of its operating environment. Work such as
[3], [1] allows to evaluate the overhead of specific protection
mechanisms, w.r.t. performance, area, power, etc. However,
they only allow a lab-based design space exploration, and
only deliver results for fixed operating conditions. For en-
tirely software-based applications, e.g. [4] provides a multi-
dimensional optimization, which includes reliability, to exploit
the potential of network on chip based MPSoCs. The described
optimization performs application mapping based on resource
slack, i.e. unused resources. The remapping can also be applied
in-field, e.g. after one resource fails. In case of sufficient
slack in this situation, a new application mapping can be
determined. On the other hand, [5] describes an FPGA hosted
satellite application that is able to reactively switch its mode
of operation to increase its reliability. The predetermined
configurations exhibit different speedup factors and failure
probabilities. Switching is performed based on the observed
application failure rate. [6] extends this approach by using an
internal Block RAM as a radiation particle sensor in order
to be independent of application failure detection for suitable
reactions.
Our approach of in-field adaptation that reasons on a model-
based representation of the system is new compared to the
state-of-the-art, in the sense that it aims to replace lab-based
application integration. In doing so, it allows the system to
adapt its applications to different environment conditions. I.e.
through observing its own environment and the health state
of its applications, the system becomes self-aware [7], which
goes beyond the reactive control e.g. discussed in [5], [6].
W.r.t. self-awareness approaches for systems, we extend the
state of art (e.g. summarized in [8]) by providing a platform
centric method. More precisely, the self-awareness is part of
the system and its resource management rather than being
application specific. Another attempt in this direction are self-
aware middleware solutions such as [9]. However, the MCC
solution proposed by us does not need to be deployed as a
run-time mechanism within the system. To our knowledge,
it is the first self-aware approach that allows the platform
to assess the reliability of its applications and adapt its
configuration based on the expected environment. In doing so,
it ensures the availability of critical applications with an ex-
pected reliability. Without the adaptation the reliability would,
in harsher environments, decrease below the required one, and
in consequence limit the availability of the application.
III. APPLICATION RELIABILITY MODELING
In today’s design processes the reliability under soft errors
is rarely determined on application basis, but rather a property
of the enabling HW-SW platform. In consequence, the avail-
ability of individual applications under soft errors is thus only
anticipated based on the reliability estimation of the platform.
However, due to the high integration level of today’s ICs
it is required to consider reliability on hierarchical levels.
A System-on-Chip (SoC) can be considered as a system
of systems, as it is composed of multiple components with
dedicated failure rates. This applies for CPU-FPGA SoCs in
particular, which posses a differing soft error susceptibility of
processor cores and FPGA fabric. Furthermore, when running
applications with mixed criticality on the same hardware
components, the reliability and consequently availability goals
differ. Typically, a highly critical application requires a higher
success rate compared to a less critical application. These
aspects require analyzing reliability on a decomposed resource
level and for different applications separately.
In the following we will elaborate a cross-layer model for a
reliability representation of computation systems, which satis-
fies system decomposition. The sub-components of a CPU-
FPGA SoC feature different fault susceptibilities, therefore
reliability is affected when migrating the execution of tasks
from software to hardware and vice versa. We allow multiple
tasks to be mapped to a sub-component (e.g. an FPGA region
or CPU core) which implies time-sharing. For the FPGA this
means that it supports Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (DPR)
for switching between hardware tasks in reconfigurable FPGA
regions. On a CPU core, time-sharing of software tasks is
carried out by context switch.
The reliability prediction stage (Figure 2) is part of the
configuration verification process in Figure 1 and validates
the system configuration candidates against reliability require-
ments. In a first step, the model estimates task failure rates.
For this, the susceptibility of resources contained in the HW
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Fig. 2. MCC Reliability Prediction Stage.
respectively to the resources being occupied during their ex-
ecution. Furthermore, the environment of operation (radiation
particle flux, temperature, etc.) has to be measured or provided.
A detailed discussion of the task failure rate estimation follows
in subsection III-A.
In a second step, the model allows to compute the reliability
for each application of the system. An application is described
in a functional- and timing model, which provide all relevant
information for determining the reliability from task failure
rates. A detailed discussion of the application reliability cal-
culation follows in subsection III-B.
A. Task Failure Rate Estimation
Calculating an application reliability from error rates on bit
level quickly becomes a sophisticated problem for complex
systems. The RAP model in [10] suggests computing the
probability of a bit error for different fault origins in a
first step. Subsequently, the probability of application failures
is calculated by applying transformation functions between
multiple abstraction levels, e.g., bit errors are transformed
into word errors, which are transformed in interface errors,
and so forth. This in-depth approach generates very accurate
results, if 1) reliable data exists on bit errors, and if 2)
the transformations between abstraction levels are known.
This typically applies for the FPGA fabric of CPU-FPGA
SoCs: bit error probabilities can be calculated from reliability
reports such as [11] and transformation functions can be easily
generated, e.g., by running fault injection tests such as [12].
However, the RAP model has its limitations for the CPU part
of many SoCs due to imprecise data on bit error rates and an
incomplete description of the system through transformation
functions. Typically, fault injection tools are not available for
the processor systems, and beam tests are too expensive to
generate transformation functions for specific applications. To
overcome this problem for practical applications, we suggest
analyzing failure rates on different decomposition levels. An
error rate analysis on bit level produces the most accurate
results and is aspired, but not always possible. Here we
fall back to an incomplete decomposition, which is com-
pensated through higher conservative upper bounds on error
probabilities. The decomposition of resources ends if there
are no error rates or transformation functions available for
a deeper level. For the Xilinx Zynq-7000 SoC family, being
used in the case study in section V, the FPGA fabric can
be decomposed down to bit level and comprises configuration
memory (CMEM), registers (flip-flops, latches), logic (LUTs),
and block memory (BRAM) respectively. The decomposition
of the ARM processor system ends on ALU, FPU, L1 and L2
caches.
A soft error in one of the named resources may (but not
always will) result in a failure in the task currently executed.
This is expressed in a vulnerability factor v. Hence, the task
failure rate calculates as in Equation 1, similar to the parts
count analysis [13]. For each resource type i being occupied by
a task during its execution, the product of quantity Ni, failure





The soft error failure rate λi for each resource type of the
hardware platform is computed as a function of current envi-
ronment conditions. As an example, the failure rate induced
by a particle flux Φ can be computed from the resource’s
cross section (Equation 2). The calculation considers the
energy distribution of particles by using a cross section fitted
with Weibull parameters. For simplicity in the case study in
section V, we estimate an upper bound of the upset rate by





σi(E)Φ(E)dE < σi,sat · Φ (2)
The particle flux in a changing environment can be measured
by on-board sensors (e.g. [6]) or be supplied from external
information sources (e.g. NASA’s Space Weather Prediction
Center1).
When considering SEEs as the main fault origin, the impact
of each resource type on the task failure rate can be calculated
using Equation 1 and 2. The following parameters have to be
determined as inputs:
• Susceptibility of resources to SEEs (cross section σi) as
a parameter of the hardware platform.
• Number of resources occupied by a task (Ni) and
• probability of a soft error to result in a failure (vulnera-
bility factor vi) as parameters of the resource requirement
library.
• Radiation particle flux (Φ) provided through an environ-
ment sensing.
Those parameters will be discussed in detail for the resource
types being present in a CPU-FPGA coupled system, such as
a Xilinx Zynq-7000 SoC.
1) FPGA fabric resources: Most non-destructive SEEs that
disturb the FPGA fabric eventually corrupt the content of a
storage element. There are three different memory types with
distinctive soft error behavior present in the FPGA fabric.
Configuration Memory (CMEM): The CMEM defines the
1swpc.noaa.gov
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logical operation of the FPGA. It sets the combinatorial and
sequential circuitry of functional blocks and their connectivity.
The cross section σCMEM per bit can be computed from
failure rates being provided in reliability reports [11] or beam
tests [14]. The number of bits NCMEM used by a task scales
linearly with the occupied FPGA area, i.e. the size of a
reconfigurable region. Not all CMEM cells affect the proper
operation of a specific design, hence only a part of the CMEM
has to be considered for reliability. This will be expressed
by weighting the CMEM with a vulnerability factor vCMEM ,
which denotes the proportion of essential bits. Soft errors in
non-essential bits do not lead to a function failure and can
be safely ignored. [12] and [15] characterize the failures of
specific FPGA designs by classifying deviations observed in
the output vectors after injecting errors into the CMEM. This
allows an accurate calculation of the proportion of essential
bits of a design. However, such a detailed characterization is
costly and not available for all FPGA designs. Alternatively,
a conservative estimate of essential bits is being reported by
FPGA vendors tools.
Registers: Sequential circuits of an FPGA design use flip-
flops, latches, and distributed RAM as storage elements. The
cross section of a register σreg is assumed to be similar to
the cross section of a CMEM bit, by reason of the similar
structure in silicon. The number of registers Nreg being used
in an FPGA design is reported in the respective toolchains.
For the reliability prediction, it will be assumed that all
registers are essential for correct operation (vulnerability factor
vreg = 1). Note that this is a conservative over-estimation, as
a design might contain surplus registers that are not addressed
in normal operation. When applying redundancy schemes,
e.g. Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), only multiple soft
errors result in a function failure. Such techniques decrease
the vulnerability factor by order of magnitude, however they
require a high resource overhead.
Block Random Access Memory (BRAM): A typical
FPGA design requires memory blocks to buffer input- and
output data and to store intermediate results. In order to
serve these needs, the FPGA fabric contains BRAM resources.
The regular structure of BRAM is more susceptible to soft
errors than CMEM and registers, hence [14] reports a higher
cross section σBRAM . The vendor’s synthesis tools directly
generate the number NBRAM being instantiated for a task.
Typically, not all bits of a BRAM are actively used during
operation of the task, which is expressed by a vulnerability
factor vBRAM < 1. Error Detection and Correction (EDAC)
codes can mitigate soft errors in BRAM, resulting in a further
decreased vulnerability factor vBRAM .
2) Processor resources: Analogous to the FPGA fabric,
different resources can be distinguished within a processor
system. For the investigated Zynq-7000 architecture, the SEE
sensitivity and respective cross sections σi have been evaluated
for five functional blocks (on-chip memory, L1d cache, ALU,
FPU, and peripheral) [16]. At this point we resign a further
decomposition of resources due to the lack of test data on
bit error susceptibility and unknown transformation between
bit error rates and application error rates in the Cortex-A9
system. The resources can be either used (Ni = 1) or
not used (Ni = 0), e.g., when compiling a task without
FPU features or disabling caches. As there is no further
data available on the vulnerability of dedicated assembly
instructions, a conservative vulnerability of vALU/FPU = 1 is
assumed. Mitigation of soft errors in processor systems, such
as lockstep or TMR techniques [17], can be modeled by a
decreased vulnerability factor, however none of these features
are available in the investigated Cortex-A9 architecture. For
caches, the vulnerability scales with the cache hit rate, because
each cache miss masks a soft error and the erroneous bit will
be replaced. Note that this approximation also accounts for
bit flips in the cache logic, since the control logic is also
considered while determining the cross section.
3) Memory: Data being stored in external memory is also
exposed to soft errors. Particularly memories targeted for space
applications have been thoroughly tested and memory cell
cross sections σmem are provided [18]. This typically allows
a contemplation of memory errors on bit level. The number
of memory bits used by a task Nmem scales with program-
and data memory size. The vulnerability is conservatively
estimated with vmem = 1, which implies that each memory
word will be used during task execution eventually. Again the
vulnerability can be reduced through soft error mitigation tech-
niques such as EDAC codes for memory content protection.
B. Computing Application Reliability
Up to this point, we have characterized the susceptibility of
HW resources and calculated task failure rates. However, in
order to predict the reliability also the temporal aspect is of
importance, i.e. how long a task occupies the HW and is thus
susceptible to SEEs. In order to be able to predict application
reliability, applications and platform are described by a cross-
layer model. In this model, applications are decomposed in a
functional model, which is subsequently mapped to task model
that describes temporal behavior of the application, i.e. how
long and often HW resources are occupied.
Definition 1. A functional model is a graph FG = (F,L, w−→
,
r−→) with F as the set of Function Blocks (FBs), L denoting
the set of data labels and w−→, r−→ defining two precedence
relations between FBs and labels and vice versa denoting
writing and reading of labels.
This is similar to a control and data flow graph, with the
exceptions that exchanged data is explicitly modeled by labels
and the actual control flow may jump and branch within a FB.
In order to be aware of timing implications, the FBs of FG
are mapped to executable tasks of the timing model. Labels
are mapped to storage resources.
Definition 2. A timing model is a tuple T G = (T ,R,→, ξ)
with T representing the set of tasks, → defining a directed
precedence relation between tasks such that output/completion
events become activation events of the succeeding one, R as
the set of HW resources, and ξ as a function that maps each
task to the resources that provide execution time to its jobs
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according to the resource’s scheduling policy.
Note that tasks can either be implemented as software tasks,
executed on processor resources, or hardware tasks, executed
in a dynamically reconfigurable region of the FPGA. The
concrete execution of a task is referred to as a job, i.e. if a
software task is activated twice, two jobs must be processed.
Multiple tasks can be mapped to the same resource, implying
that the resource is shared in time. Further, one task can
spawn jobs on more than one resource if it is mapped to
many. Resource sharing consequently implies, that a schedule
is maintained for each resource in R. Through the mapping
of FBs to tasks, and again tasks to resources, an execution
trace can be generated from the schedules. The trace consists
of the necessary jobs of all tasks to realize the functionality
described by FG.
Again, the resources are described by a hierarchical resource
model, i.e. the region of an FPGA is characterized by the
maximum amount of BRAM, CMEM, etc. Similarly, proces-
sor resources are decomposed as introduced in the previous
subsection.
An application reliability requirement is expressed as a
success probability pi ∈ [0; 1] of one execution of a connected
subgraph Greq of the functional model FG, or as probability
of failure per hour (PFH) / probability of failure on demand
(PFD) requirements as e.g. mandated by safety standards such
as IEC 61508 [2].
The failure rate is assumed to be constant during the
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whereas λtask is computed according to Equation 2. Tvul is
the time a task’s job is actively occupying the resources. In
our approach, we determine Tvul for each necessary job of
a task individually. Therefore, the mapping of each FB and
data label must be known as well as the time the task is
vulnerable, i.e. is active on the resource. For jobs of a HW
task this implies the time of the execution plus the preceding
configuration, if the HW task needs to be loaded, i.e. there
was no directly preceding job. For software tasks we assume,
that its vulnerable time Tvul is the maximum time a job
of the task is active, i.e. the vulnerable time is the worst-
case response time (WCRT) of the task. The response time is
defined as the time interval between activation of a job and
its subsequent termination. It includes the time when a job
is e.g. preempted due to higher priority tasks executing. With
this over approximation, we make certain that we require the
HW to be fault free as long as state of a job is maintained in
its registers. In our setup, the WCRT of a task is determined
based on Compositional Performance Analysis (CPA) [19],
which processes the timing model.
The success tree of any reliability constraint can be treated
as a line topology. Although the functional graph FG might
contain parallel strands, the successful execution still depends
on the successful execution of all the involved jobs of all
involved tasks. We assume that the reliability of the individual
jobs is statistically independent, as we conservatively assume
that no fault-masking occurs due to burst errors. Consequently
the application reliability Rapp of a connected subtree of FG
can be calculated in combination with Equation 3 as the






All the assumptions made for Equation 3 and 4 are conserva-
tive. For software tasks, we only take into account conservative
upper bounds for the WCRT, as well as for hardware tasks,
where each task is treated as fully vulnerable, even if a module
is not yet fully configured.
IV. SELF-ADAPTATION
In order to adapt the system to changing conditions, the
MCC performs a model-based integration of available func-
tion implementations. In this integration process, it tries to
find a configuration that matches the input models and their
requirements. In general, the trigger for the MCC to change
the configuration of the system, are any changes to the input
models of the MCC. Yet, in this paper we specifically focus
on the environment model of the system.
In general, the MCC enriches model layers and synthesizes
new layers in a stepwise process, starting from the top-most
layer. Depending on the system’s hardware and software setup,
i.e. number of CPU cores and FPGAs, the operating system
and its model of computation, various layers can be generated.
The top-most layer is implementation agnostic, i.e. it only
specifies the intended functionality without dictating whether a
function block is implemented in either software or hardware.
In the scope of this paper, we start the integration from the
functional layer FG and derive a configuration of the system
that is specified by the task layer and resource layer of the
cross-layer model.
The synthesis of a configuration consists of a series of
three distinct step types: parameter decision, transformation,
and check. First, parameter decisions are preformed on the
functional model, before a transformation into tasks and re-
sources can be conducted. Typical parameter decisions are e.g.
mapping decisions of functions to processing units (FPGA
or CPU), the selection of the redundancy mode of a task
(TMR or none) or the synthesis of a schedule. The parameter
decisions typically prepare the second step type, transforma-
tion: E.g. selecting a hardware implementation where data
labels are pipelined over an interconnect between hardware
components (cf. Figure 3) instead of exchanging it via the main
DRAM-memory. The third step type, check, is an admission
test for a specific layer. It performs validation tests on the
transformation, e.g. whether the transformation meets the
available hardware resources’ capabilities such as available
field-programmable gate array (FPGA) area. If a check can
not be passed successfully, the process rolls back transforma-
tions and design decisions, and iterates over another variant.
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For component-based operating systems, detailed account on
parameter decisions and transformations is given in [20]. Since
this process might lead to an exhaustive design-space explo-
ration, we apply heuristics where possible to mimic a human
designer in a manual integration process. For the case study
presented in section V, an optimization algorithm generates
configurations which are optimized for throughput of the
presented application. However, note that not all requirements
of all applications can be holistically optimized, hence the
third step type check is necessary. A particular admission test
is the reliability estimation for each application as described
in the previous section.
The change process of the MCC, i.e. the search for new
configurations, in the scope of this paper is triggered by a
change in particle flux, and respectively by a change in the
environment model. Through constant self-adaption of the
system, its availability is increased, i.e. the fraction of time
in which all minimum requirements are at least fulfilled. Note
that this search can execute as a background task and does not
necessarily need to be conducted once a requirement is already
violated. Furthermore, the MCC can be used for other self-
adaptations as well. In this case, changes in other input models
may trigger the MCC. For instance, a change of the functional
layer could request other or additional functionalities to be
executed on the platform.
V. CASE-STUDY AND DISCUSSION
For an evaluation of the self-adaption and reliability pre-
diction mechanism of the MCC, a stereo-vision application
will be analyzed. In the given application, a set of left and
right images is being processed according to the functional
graph depicted in the upper half of Figure 3. Note that
besides the stereo-vision application shown in the FG further
applications can share the platform. Both images are converted
from bayer to RGB format (Debayer) and subsequently the
Rectify FB removes camera distortions. Stereomatch computes
a disparity map, which is converted to a pointcloud (Disp2Pc),
and finally filtered in a pass through Filter. For each FB an
implementation in both hardware and software is available,
except for the pass through filter for which only a software
implementation exists. Redundant hardware implementations
using TMR are currently being developed. Hardware tasks are
able to time-share the available FPGA resources and are sched-
uled in predefined reconfigurable regions of the FPGA fabric
using DPR. The implementation variants of the tasks differ
in their failure rate and execution time. By choosing different
mappings from FBs to either standard or TMR tasks, multiple
configurations with varying reliability and performance can be
generated. A lower performance (or higher makespan) implies
a lower stereo-vision frame rate and possible robot speed,
hence we do not force a hard requirement on this parameter.
The MCC reliability prediction requires a parametrization
of the resource susceptibilities of the hardware platform. This
is expressed as cross sections σi and has been retrieved from
[14] for the FPGA resources CMEM, registers, and BRAM.












































Fig. 3. The cross-layer model for one configuration of the case study
application: The upper half shows the FG and the bottom the T G. Mappings
of tasks to resources are depicted by blue arrows, while the mapping from
FG to T G is indicated by color, i.e. identical color denotes a mapping.
caches have been retrieved from [16]. The L2 cross section
has been extrapolated from σL1, assuming an identical cell
layout for L1 and L2.
Furthermore, the model requests the resource requirements
of the task library. The number of resources occupied by hard-
ware tasks has been obtained from resource usage reports of
the Vivado toolchain. Reports on essential bits of the CMEM
are used to compute precise vulnerability factors vCMEM .
Register and BRAM vulnerabilities have not been analyzed
in detail yet, hence a conservative values vreg/BRAM = 1 are
assumed. Respective model inputs for TMR hardware tasks
are extrapolated from their non-TMR variant. Software tasks
have been compiled with FPU flags and all caches enabled,
therefore all processor resources ALU, FPU, L1d, L1i, and
L2 are being used. The cache hit rate has been obtained for
each software task for all caches through cachegrind ([21],
valgrind.org), and allows to provide an accurate estimation of
cache vulnerability factors.
A preceding step of the MCC generates configuration can-
didates for the stereo-vision application with varying compo-
sitions of (TMR-) HW and SW tasks. This step generates
solutions by exploring the design space through iterative
assignement of the implementation variant, e.g. whether TMR
is enabled or not, and mapping to execution resources in R.
The performance is optimized by minimizing the makespan
of the functional graph using an algorithm developed in [22].
Non-reasonable solutions of the full permutation of tasks for
the given solution are rejected, leaving 128 candidates to be
analyzed in the here discussed reliability prediction stage.
Figure 4 plots the results of the reliability estimation as
PFH over makespan for three different particle flux intensities.
The largest flux Φ3 being analyzed roughly corresponds to an














Fig. 4. Trade-off between reliability and makespan.
Note that some of the 128 configuration candidates resemble
each other, leaving 13 clusters in the solution space. A multi-
objective optimization on both makespan and PFH would
reject all solutions above a pareto front, which leaves 4
contemplable clusters per flux intensity.
For an initial or updated configuration, the reliability pre-
diction stage checks the fulfillment of all reliability require-
ments. Once a valid configuration has been found, it will
be deployed into the execution domain. E.g., the discussed
application may start during a low-radiation time period (Φ1)
with a high-performance configuration and a makespan of
1306 ms (marked as 1© in Figure 4). During operation, the
reliability requirements are reevaluated on any environment
change. Once any reliability requirement check fails, new con-
figuration candidates are requested until a valid solution has
been found. Subsequently, the new configuration is deployed.
For instance, once the radiation increases to Φ2, the given
reliability requirement is violated as the configuration moves
into the forbidden red zone of Figure 4. Hence, alternative
configurations are requested and checked, until the system
settles for a configuration marked as 2© in Figure 4. The
makespan increases to 1534 ms, but the reliability requirement
is met. Hence, the system stays available. For even higher
particle flux values (e.g. Φ3), a configuration marked as 3©
with a makespan of 3162 ms will be selected.
While the runtime of the configuration candidate generation
scales with the complexity of the FG that has to be mapped,
the computation of reliability predictions is swift. Although the
predictor has to extract job dependencies from T G, which in
theory is an exponential problem, practical instances compute
within ≈ 1s on standard desktop computers2.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented two contributions: First, we have demon-
strated the applicability of our model and approach to a
2Core i5-3210, 8GiB RAM, singlethreaded
complex system structure, consisting of a CPU-FPGA SoC
as platform, and a sophisticated software application mapped
to it. Second, we modeled and implemented a reliability
prediction within a reconfiguration framework that allows a
system self-adaptation based on the awareness of particle
flux in its environment. Therefore, we introduced a task
failure rate estimation based on different decomposition levels.
The calculation for hardware tasks mostly relies on FPGA
vendors’ toolchain reports and therefore can be performed
easily for practical applications. We envision that predicting
the reliability under changing conditions and triggering timely
reconfigurations for e.g. safety critical applications will lead
to a more economic resource usage in benign environments,
yet ensuring availability and reliability constraints. However,
the model parameters, particularly for resource cross sections,
need to be reasonably accurate for in-field deployment for such
an approach. Further radiation testing (in particular of the CPU
systems) would allow further decomposition of the system and
hence more accurate reliability estimations. Also, applying
the model to a stereo-vision application has shown, that
reliability and performance are concurrent goals, especially if
multiple applications have to be considered. Future work can
further analyze their correlation by feeding the here proposed
reliability prediction model with multiple redundancy variants
(e.g., both spatial and temporal DMR / TMR).
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